TAXATION -TAX-EXEMPTION

TO NON-PROFIT CORPORATION

FOR

PROPERTY USED IN FURTHERANCE OF ITS TAX-EXEMPT PURPOSE

Club
of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 371 A.2d
22 (1977).
EXTENDS TO SECONDARY PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS -Boys'

In 1962, Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. (Boys' Club), a non-profit
corporation,' purchased 33.25 acres of land in Jefferson Township,
New Jersey for the purpose of establishing a camp for boys. 2 Subsequently, in 1966, Boys' Club purchased an adjoining 63.85 acre
vacant tract of land to complement the existing camp facilities, 3 and
to qualify the camp for accreditation by the American Camping Association. 4 With this acquisition, Boys' Club intended to carry on an
assortment of programs that included camping, hiking, and conservation activities designed to instill in the young boys attending Camp
5
Clifton an "'appreciation ofl God and natural surroundings."
During the winter of 1972, Boys' Club rented several sleeping
cabins at the facility to Snow Bowl, Inc., a private corporation operat-

1 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 396, 371 A.2d 22, 24,
25-26 (1977). The township identified this original tract as Lot 15, Block 307. Id. at 396, 371
A.2d at 26.
2 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 396, 371 A.2d 22, 25
(1977). Boys' Club was incorporated as a non-profit corporation pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:1-1 (West 1933), on July 13, 1955. Brief for Petitioner-Respondent at 1, Boys' Club of
Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 137 N.J. Super. 136, 348 A.2d 209 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner-Respondent]. The general provisions governing the incorporation of
non-profit corporations can be found in N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1 to 23 (West 1933). Boys' Club
qualified as a benevolent organization established "to promote the health, social, educational,
vocational and character development of Boys." 72 N.J. at 396, 371 A.2d at 25; Brief for
Petitioner-Respondent, supra at 1. Boys' Club's designation as a charitable corporation is supported by case law. See, e.g., Y.W.C.A. of Harvey Cedars v. Pelham, 9 N.J. Misc. 196, 153 A.
397 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 108 N.J.L. 553, 158 A. 544 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932) (summer home
for girls entitled to charitable tax exemption).
a Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 396, 371 A.2d 22, 26
(1977). Boys' Club purchased the additional tract because the camp could not be adequately
operated on the original 33 acre tract. Id. Actually there were two tracts involved in the second
purchase. One tract consisted of .45 acres. The larger tract of 63.4 acres was identified by the
township as Lot IA, Block 320 and was the focus of the controversy. Id.
' See Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 396, 371 A.2d 22,
26 (1977). In order to be accredited, the American Camping Association required that the ratio
of the camp's acreage to campers be one to one. With the purchase of Lot IA, Block 320 Boys'
Club's acreage totaled 99.9 acres, just short of the 100 acres needed to be accredited for 100
campers, the number the camp was designed to service. Although accreditation was given to
Boys' Club, it would not have been granted without the purchase of Lot 1A, Block 320. Brief
for Petitioner-Respondent, supra note 2, at 4.
5 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 396, 371 A.2d 22, 26
(1977) (quoting Brief for Petitioner-Respondent, supra note 2, at 2-3).
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ing a local ski resort. 6 For a nominal fee, Boys' Club also permitted
groups of college students to use the area for ecological programs. 7
Despite the receipt of this additional income, the camp operated at a
loss for the tax years of 1971 and 1972.8
Pursuant to section 4-3.6 of Title 54 of the New Jersey statutes, 9
the land and buildings on the original 33.25 acre tract were designated by Jefferson Township as exempt from local real property taxes
due to Boys' Club's status as a qualified charitable organization.10
6 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 397, 371 A.2d 22, 26
(1977). Four of the camp's dormitory cabins were utilized to house the staff of Snow Bowl, Inc.
from November 1972 through March 1973 and from November 1973 through March 1974. Brief
for Petitioner-Respondent, supra note 2, at 4-5. In addition, in 1972, 25 young skiers from
Snow Bowl, Inc. were housed for a single weekend. 72 N.J. at 397, 371 A.2d at 26 (1977).
7 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 397, 371 A.2d 22, 26
(1977). Religious groups were also permitted to use the facilities of Camp Clifton. Id.
8 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 397, 371 A.2d 22, 26
(1977). The actual losses sustained were $3,200 in 1970, more than $15,000 in 1971 and $1,850
in 1972. Id. Boys' Club's detailed financial reports indicated that the fees charged to campers
represented only a small fraction of the operating costs associated with running the camp. Brief
for Petitioner-Respondent, supra note 2, at 5-7. For further discussion of the effect that a
corporation's net profit has on its non-profit status, see notes 45-49 infra and accompanying text.
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). This provision grants
a tax exemption to non-profit corporations for property used by the corporation in furtherance of
its tax-exempt purpose. The statute provides in part that
[t]he following property shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter: ...
all buildings actually and exclusively used in the work of associations and corporations organized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women
and children, or for religious, charitable or hospital purposes, or for one or more
such purposes; all buildings owned or held by an association or corporation created
for the purpose of holding the title to such buildings as are actually and exclusively
used in the work of 2 or more associations or corporations organized exclusively for
the moral and mental improvement of men, women and children; all buildings
owned by a corporation created under or otherwise subject to the provisions of Title
15 of the Revised Statutes and actually and exclusively used in the work of one or
more associations or corporations organized exclusively for charitable or religious
purposes, which associations or corporations may or may not pay rent for the use of
the premises or the portions of the premises used by them; . . . the land whereon
any of the buildings hereinbefore mentioned are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, and which is devoted to the purposes above
mentioned and to no other purpose and does not exceed 5 acres in extent; . . .
provided, in case of all the foregoing, the buildings, or the lands on which they
stand, or the associations, corporations or institutions using or occupying them as
aforesaid, are not conducted for profit, except that the exemption of the buildings
and lands used for charitable, benevolent or religious purposes shall extend to cases
where the charitable, benevolent or religious work therein carried on is supported
partly by fees and charges received from or on behalf of beneficiaries using or occupying the buildings; provided, the building is wholly controlled by and the entire
income therefrom is used for said charitable, benevolent or religious purposes. . ..
Id.
10 See Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 396, 371 A.2d 22,
25-26 (1977).
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This charitable tax exemption was extended to the 1966 acquisition
In 1971 and 1972 Jefferson Township asuntil the 1971 tax year.'
sessed property taxes on the 1966 acquisition, designated as Lot LA,
Block 320 (Lot LA),' 2 but left the exemption of the original tract undisturbed.1 3 The Morris County Tax Board affirmed the Township's
tax assessment. 14 On Boys' Club's appeal, the New Jersey Division
of Tax Appeals reinstated the charitable tax exemption. 15 The appellate division reversed and remanded the dispute to the New Jersey
Division of Tax Appeals for further fact finding.' 6 That court af17
firmed its prior determination that the tax exemption was proper.
Upon Jefferson Township's appeal, the appellate division disallowed
the exemption."' Following grant of certification,' 9 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in the six-to-one decision of Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson,20 reversed the appellate division
by ultimately finding that Lot LA was entitled to tax exempt treat-

'
(1977).
12

Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 394, 371 A.2d 22, 24-25
Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 394, 397, 371 A.2d 22,

25, 26 (1977).
13 See Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 72 N.J. 389, 397, 371 A.2d 22,
26 (1977). The tax exempt status was not questioned as the buildings were constructed on the
original piece of property. See id.
14 Morris County Tax Bd., Appeal No. 276 (Nov. 9, 1972). While affirming the assessment
of the newly acquired tract of land, Lot IA, Block 320, the Morris County Tax Board also
allowed the exemption of the original tract, Lot 15, Block 307, to remain in effect. See Morris
County Tax Bd., Appeal No. 277 (Nov. 9, 1972).
" Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, No. L-3928 71 (N.J. Div. of Tax
App., Apr. 4, 1974). In his decision, Judge Convery stated that the adjoining tract, Lot 1A,
Block 320, was exempt due to the fact that it was used for the same purposes that were the
basis of the tax exemption on Lot 15, Block 307 and that the 99 acres were within the statutory
maximum for the 28 buildings.
16 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, No. A-2423 73 (App. Div. June 25,
1974).
17 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, Nos. L-3928 71, L-3950 72 (N.J.
Div. of Tax App., Jan. 9, 1975). This decision, which included consideration of the exclusivity of
use of Lot IA, Block 320, was decided in favor of Boys' Club. The court found, notwithstanding
the off-season use of the camp by Snow Bowl, Inc. and charitable organizations, that the monies
received for these uses did not in any way indicate that profit was the motivating factor. Id.
at 4.
18 Boys' Club of Clifton, Inc. v. Township of Jefferson, 137 N.J. Super. 136, 141, 348 A.2d
209, 211 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 72 N.J. 389, 371 A.2d 22 (1977). In their Boys'
Club decision, the appellate division held that the tax exemption questioned was controlled by
Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699, 65 A. 500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907). which limited the
applicability of the exemption to " 'the land whereon the building is erected.' " Boys' Club v.
Township of Jefferson, 137 N.J. Super. 136, 139, 348 A.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd and
remanded, 72 N.J. 389, 371 A.2d 22 (1977) (emphasis in original).
19 Boys' Club v. Township of Jefferson, 70 N.J. 143, 358 A.2d 190 (1976).
20 72 N.J. 389, 371 A.2d 22 (1977).
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ment. 2 1 The supreme court held that where a section 54:4-3.6 qualifying non-profit corporation's buildings are devoted exclusively for the
qualified purpose, then all adjacent and adjoining property used for
the same purpose, irrespective of the date of the property's acquisition, is exempt from taxation to the extent of five acres per building. 22 In reaching this decision, the court discredited the existing
23
charitable tax exemption test.
New Jersey courts have long adhered to the majority rule of
strict construction of statutes which grants exemptions from taxation. 24 Under the majority rule, all doubts must be resolved against
the taxpayer seeking a statutory tax exemption, based upon the principle that the burden of taxation should be shared equally. 25 Consis21 Id. at 405, 371 A.2d at 30.
22 See id.at 404-05, 371 A.2d at 30.
23 See id. at 397-98, 371 A.2d at 26-27. The Boys' Club decision eliminated the two-prong
test of Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699, 65 A.500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907), which had
been followed in numerous cases. 72 N.J. at 398, 371 A.2d at 27; see notes 62-69 infra and
accompanying text.
24 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 172 A.2d 420 (1961) (tax
statutes construed against claimant); Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Inst., 20 N.J. 86,
118 A.2d 809 (1956) (all doubts resolved against claimant); Julius Roehrs Co. v. Division of Tax
Appeals, 16 N.J. 493, 109 A.2d 611 (1955) (exemption represents departure from fundamental
principle that all property bear fair share of tax burden); Textile Printers Corp. v. Director,
Div. of Taxation, 145 N.J. Super. 456, 368 A.2d 375 (App. Div. 1976) (exemptions construed
against claimant); Locustwood Cemetery Ass'n v. Cherry Hill, 133 N.J. Super. 92, 304 A.2d 750
(App. Div. 1975) (burden of proving exemption on claimant); In re Tillis Estate, 123 N.J. Super.
280, 302 A.2d 539 (App. Div. 1973) (claimant, not state, has burden to prove exemption); Township of Princeton v. Tenacre Foundation, 69 N.J. Super. 559, 174 A.2d 601 (App. Div. 1961)
(tax exemption strictly construed against claimant).
This principle is widely recognized by other jurisdictions as a fundamental rule to be
applied in interpreting tax statutes. See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 246 Ala. 486, 21 So.2d 316
(1945) (rule of strict construction is in keeping with principle of "equality is equity"); Hartford
Hosp. v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 279 A.2d 561 (1971) (tax exemptions no matter how
meritorious must 'be strictly construed); State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 752, 2 So.2d 303
(1941) (exemptions from taxation are special favors frowned on by courts); People ex rel. Paschen
v. Hendrickson-Pontiac, Inc., 9 I11.
2d 250, 137 N.E.2d 381 (1956) (framers of Constitution
intended district construction of tax exemptions of property); Arkansas City v. Board of County Comm.,
197 Kan. 728, 420 P.2d 1016 (1966) (strict construction of tax exemptions as exceptions to tax
statutes); Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 51, 57 S.W. 532 (1900) (cardinal principle of tax exemption laws is strict construction); People ex rel. Unity Congregational Soc'y v. Mills, 189 Misc.
774, 71 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (exemptions from taxation are not favored and are strictly
construed). But see Kemp v. Pillar of Fire, 94 Colo. 41, 27 P.2d 1036 (1933) (tax statutes
granting exemptions to property used for charitable purposes should be less strictly construed
than those granting exemptions for property used for gain or profit); Adams County v. Catholic
Diocese, 110 Miss. 890, 71 So. 17 (1916) (exemption for religious institution will not be subjected to same strict construction applied to corporation created for gain or profit).
22 See, e.g., Bloomfield v. Academy of Medicine, 47 N.J. 358, 363, 221 A.2d 15, 18 (1966);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214, 172 A.2d 420, 422 (1961);
Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Inst., 20 N.J. 86, 90, 118 A.2d 809, 811 (1955); Township of Princeton v. Tenacre Foundation, 69 N.J. Super. 559, 563, 174 A.2d 601, 604 (App. Div. 1961);
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tent with the general principles of statutory construction, when interpreting tax statutes the courts are bound by the legislature's purpose
for enacting the statute. 2 6 Accordingly, when a literal interpretation
of the statute would lead to a result not intended by the legislature,
the legislative intent will prevail over a literal reading of the statutory
language. 27 Section 54:4-3.628 is an attempt by the legislature to
assist, by way of property tax relief, non-profit corporations that provide services benefiting society as a whole. 2 9 In order to qualify for
an exemption under the statute, a non-profit organization must show

Rector of Christ Church v. Township of Millburn, 26 N.J. Misc. 123, 125-26, 57 A.2d 506, 507
(Div. Tax App. 1948).
26 See, e.g., Township of Princeton v. Tenacre Foundation, 69 N.J. Super. 559, 563, 174
A.2d 601, 604 (App. Div. 1961).
27 See id.

28 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The present
statute is a direct descendant of a supplement to the first tax act enacted in 1846. A supplement
to the act entitled "An Act concerning taxes" approved April fourteenth, eighteen hundred and
forty-six, ch. 5, § 2, [1851] N.J. LAWS 271. An 1866 amendment added the "necessary for the
fair enjoyment" requirement and the five acre maximum exemption. See A further supplement
as an act entitled "An Act concerning taxes," ch. 487, § 5, [1866] N.J. LAws 1078. These words
which now appear to limit the exemption, actually expanded the exemption to include land as
well as the building. Compare A supplement to the act entitled "An Act concerning taxes"
approved April fourteenth, eighteen hundred and forty-six, ch. 5, § 2, [1851] N.J. LAws 271
with A further supplement to an act entitled "An Act concerning taxes," ch. 487, § 5, [1866]
N.J. LAws 1078.
The Tax Revision of 1903, An Act for the assessment and collection of taxes, ch. 208, § 1,
[1903] N.J. LAws 394, superceded all previous tax acts, and added the actual and exclusive use
requirement on the building. See id.This statute also added a rent provision, which allowed the
claimant to receive rental income from a tenant without disturbing the exemption as long as the
rental income was utilized for the furtherance of the charity's purposes. See id.
The 1918 Tax Revision, An Act for the assessment and collection of taxes, ch. 236, § 203,
[1818] N.J. LAws 847, repealed the 1903 Tax Revision. However, the 1918 Revision contained
no significant changes in language. Compare An Act for the assessment and collection of taxes,
ch. 208, § 1, [1903] N.J. LAws 394 with An Act for the assessment and collection of taxes, ch.
236, § 203, [1918] N.J. Laws 847. The present statute is derived directly from the 1918 act. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
The 1918 Act has been amended thirteen times with most of the amendments being minor,
with the exception of the 1949 amendment. See An act concerning exemptions from taxation,
and amending, section 54:3.6 of the Revised Statutes, ch. 85, § 1, [1949] N.J. LAws 394. The
1949 amendment was significant in that it broadened the rent income provision. Id. Specifically,
the 1949 amendment was designed to overcome the result in Trustees of Y.M. & Y.W.H.A. v.
Millburn Twp., 119 N.J.L. 504, 506, 197 A. 372, 373 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 121 N.J.L. 65, 1 A.2d
367 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (en banc), which had held the exemption would be lost upon
evidence of rental income. For a discussion of the effect of the 1949 amendment on the holding
in Trustees of Y.M. & Y.W.H.A., see notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text.
29 See Kimberly School v. Town of Montclair, 137 N.J.L. 402, 404-05, 60 A.2d 313, 314
(Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 2 N.J. 28, 65 A.2d 500 (1948) (rendering of public service
relieved public of burden); Carteret Academy v. State Bd. of Taxes, 102 N.J.L. 525, 529, 133 A.
886, 887 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd, 104 N.J.L. 165, 138 A. 919 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927) (provision of
an essentially public service by nonprofit organization).
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that its buildings and land are exclusively used for a charitable, benevolent or religious purpose. 30 That determination is made by con3
sidering the facts and circumstances of each case. '
The statute sets forth three requirements which must be satisfied
in order to obtain a charitable tax exemption. 32 First, the building
must be "actually and exclusively used" for a qualified charitable purpose. 3 3 Second, the organization must not be "conducted for
profit." 34 Third, the land must be land upon which the building is constructed, "necessary for the fair enjoyment" of the building, and not
35
exceeding five acres of land.
Generally, the test for actual and exclusive use considers both
the exclusiveness of the organization's qualified purpose and the physical use of the property. 36 Case law is illustrative but not binding, 3 7
38
since the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.
30 See Town of Bloomfield v. Academy of Medicine, 47 N.J. 358, 363, 221 A.2d 15, 18
(1966); Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214, 172 A.2d 420, 423
(1961); Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent de Paul v. Brakeley, 67 N.J.L. 176, 178, 50
A. 589, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
31 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 127 N.J.L. 105, 106, 21 A.2d 644,
645 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd sub nom. City of Trenton v. Rider College, 128 N.J.L. 320, 25 A.2d
630 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942); Congregation B'nai Yisroel v. Township of Millburn, 35 N.J. Super.
67, 72, 113 A.2d 182, 184 (App. Div. 1955); Rector of Christ Church v. Township of Millburn,
26 N.J. Misc. 123, 126, 57 A.2d 506, 507 (Div. Tax App. 1948).
32 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For a discussion
of the three requirements, see notes 33-52 infra and accompanying text.
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For a discussion of
the history of this requirement, see note 28 supra.
34 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For cases outlining the
limits of non-profitability, see Town of Bloomfield v. Academy of Medicine, 47 N.J. 358, 36465, 221 A.2d 15, 19 (1966) (organization geared to operate at small profit not in conflict with
statute); Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 463-64, 217 A.2d 868, 871-72
(1966) (rental income an element but not per se establishment of profitability); Princeton Univ.
Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 217, 172 A.2d 420, 424 (1961) (work done for other
non-profit organizations undertaken for purpose of making profit); Kimberly School v. Town of
Montclair, 2 N.J. 28, 33, 65 A.2d 500, 502 (1949) (entitled to exemption if not conducted for
profit); City of Trenton v. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 65 N.J. Super. 1, 10, 166 A.2d 777, 781-82
(App. Div. 1961) (no requirement that non-profit organizations undertaken for purpose of making profit); Princeton County Day School v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 N.J.L. 515, 519, 175
A. 136, 138 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (operation of school at loss not controlling on question of nonprofitability); Institute of Holy Angels v. Bender, 79 N.J.L. 34, 35-36, 74 A. 251, 251-52 (Sup.
Ct. 1909) (school's charges for tuition and board not designed to yield profit).
11 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214, 172 A.2d 420, 423
(1961). Princeton University Press appealed an assessment originally levied by the local board of
taxation. The supreme court found that a substantial portion of the Press' activities involved
printing work done for the purpose of off-setting losses incurred in the publication of scholarly
works. The court found that since such work had been accepted for the purpose of making a
profit, it took on a commercial character. The property therefore was not actually and exclusively used for the Press's tax exempt purpose. Id. at 214-15, 172 A.2d at 423-24. This approach was followed in Town of Bloomfield v. Academy of Medicine, 47 N.J. 358, 365, 221 A.2d
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A factor that has been considered in the context of actual and
exclusive use is rental income. 3 9 Rental income obtained in furtherance of any qualified purpose under the statute will not disturb the
tax exemption. 4 0 The question of rental income has been raised
primarily in the area of housing for faculty 4 l or administrative personnel. 42 In examining rental agreements, courts have had to determine whether the qualified organization has assumed a normal
landlord-tenant relationship. 4 3 If so, the primary motive for the
agreement has been held to be profit, and the exemption denied because the rental agreement was not designed to further the charitable
44
or benevolent purpose of the organization.

15, 19-20 (1966), where the supreme court granted a tax exemption on the basis that the
Academy was operated solely for "the general health and welfare of the community." Id.; cf.
Textile Research Inst. v. Township of Princeton, 35 N.J. 218, 223, 172 A.2d 417, 419 (1961)
(non-profit corporation's purpose favored solely textile industry rather than general public).
11 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 216, 172 A.2d 420,
423-24 (1961).
38 See Town of Bloomfield v. Academy of Medicine, 47 N.J. 358, 363, 221 A.2d 15, 18
(1961); Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 216, 172 A.2d 420, 423
(1961); Congregation B'nai Yisroel v. Township of Millburn, 35 N.J. Super. 67, 72, 113 A.2d
182, 184 (App. Div. 1955).
'9 See, e.g., Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 463-64, 217 A.2d 868, 871
(1966); Mayor of Princeton v. State Bd. of Taxes, 96 N.J.L. 334, 340, 115 A. 342, 345 (Sup. Ct.
1921).
40 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The statute provides in part that
all buildings owned by a corporation created under or otherwise subject to the
provisions of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes and actually and exclusively used in
the work of one or more associations or corporations organized exclusively for
charitable or religious purposes, which associations or corporations may or may not
pay rent for the use of the premises or the portions of the premises used by
them ...
Id.
41 See Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 463--64, 217 A.2d 868, 871-72
(1966) (landlord-tenant relationship between private school and faculty members secondary to
school's primary purpose of providing faculty housing on campus site); Mayor of Princeton v.
State Bd. of Taxes, 96 N.J.L. 334, 340, 115 A. 342, 345 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (tax exemption permitted where school used dormitory rental income received from employees to fund faculty
salaries); State v. Ross, 24 N.J.L. 497, 499-500 (Sup. Ct. 1854) (dwellings for professors used in
furtherance of university's purpose).
42 See City of Hoboken v. Division of Tax Appeals, 134 N.J.L. 594, 599-600, 49 A.2d 587,
590 (Sup. Ct. 1946), modified on other grounds, 136 N.J.L. 328, 55 A.2d 290 (Ct. Err. & App.
1947) (college facilities including president's house used in advancement of college's purpose).
See also Township of Princeton v. Tenacre Foundation, 69 N.J. Super. 559, 565-66, 174 A.2d
601, 605 (App. Div. 1961) (director's residence necessary for operation of institution).
43 See Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 463, 217 A.2d 868, 871 (1966).
" See, e.g., City of Hoboken v. Division of Tax Appeals, 136 N.J.L. 328, 329, 55 A.2d 290,
291 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947) (exemption warranted upon showing that rental income was not
profit for college), modifying on other grounds, 134 N.J.L. 594, 49 A.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
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Rental income is also germane to the issue of the organization's
non-profit status-the second statutory requirement for a tax exemption.4 5 The statute's focus is not directed toward the organization's
actual profit or loss, but refers to whether the organization was oper46
ated in order to make a profit.
There is no requirement within the statute that a non-profit organization operate at a loss. 47 Such a requirement, obviously, would
nullify the tax advantage offered by the statute. With this in mind,
the test for non-profitability is not whether a profit was realized, but
rather whether the fees charged were set with the intention of yielding a profit, or had been designed to minimize operating losses. 4 8
The final statutory requirement for a tax exemption focuses upon
the land rather than the building.4 9 To be exempt, the land must be
"the land whereon any of the building hereinbefore mentioned are
erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment
thereof." 50 In making this determination, the extent of the land
51
exempted may not exceed five acres per building.
Mayor of Princeton v. State Bd. of Taxes, 96 N.J.L. 334, 340, 115 A.2d 342, 345 (Sup. Ct.
1921) (rental income from faculty does not deprive school of tax exemption).
45 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The applicable
statutory language concerning the exemption of property of non-profit organizations provides
that
the associations, corporations or institutions using and occupying [the buildings] as
aforesaid, are not conducted for profit, except that the exemption of the buildings
and lands used for charitable, benevolent or religious purposes shall extend to cases
where the charitable, benevolent or religious work therein carried on is supported
partly by fees and charges received from or on behalf of beneficiaries using or occupying the buildings; provided, the building is wholly controlled by and the entire
income therefrom is used for said charitable, benevolent or religious purposes.
Id.
46 See Kimberly School v. Town of Montclair, 2 N.J. 28, 37-38, 65 A.2d 500, 506-07 (1949);
Mayor of Princeton v. State Bd. of Taxes, 96 N.J.L. 334, 338-39, 115 A. 342, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
See also Township of Denville v. St. Francis Sanitarium, 89 N.J.L. 293, 297, 98 A. 254, 255 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1916) (charitable institution qualified for tax exemption despite being funded by
fees); Bancroft School v. State Bd. of Taxes, 10 N.J. Misc. 656, 656-57, 160 A. 390, 390-91
(Sup. Ct. 1932) (no tax exemption where school for retarded children that charged substantial
fees was designated as "commercial" despite operating deficit); Institute of Holy Angels v. Bender, 79 N.J.L. 34, 36, 74 A. 251, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (school exempt since tuition charges not
established for purposes of profitability).
47 See City of Trenton v. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 65 N.J. Super. 1, 10, 166 A.2d 777,
781-82 (App. Div. 1960).
48 See Mayor of Princeton v. State Bd. of Taxes, 96 N.J.L. 334, 338-39, 115 A. 342, 344
(Sup. Ct. 1921); Institute of Holy Angels v. Bender, 79 N.J.L. 34, 35-36, 74 A. 251, 251-52
(Sup. Ct. 1909).
49 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For a detailed discussion of the origin of this language, see note 28 supra.
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The statutory
interpretation that the exemption not exceed five acres per building, as first enunciated in

1978]

NOTES

Two distinguishable interpretations of this statutory language
have evolved, resulting in two distinct lines of cases. One small group
of cases that has taken an expansive view of the language is represented by the State v. Ross52 and Congregation B'nai Yisroel v.
Township of Millburn decisions. 5 3 A second more restrictive view
that has been followed by a majority of the cases is illustrated by the
54
decision in Sisters of Charity v. Cory.
The Ross decision was the earliest case to consider both the
necessity and scope of tax exemptions granted Linder this statute. 55
The issue before the court in Ross was how much of Princeton
University's acreage was eligible for an exemption Linder the 1851
statutes 6 The court found that certain dwelling houses utilized by
professors were exempted under the statute. 57 In determining the
extent of the land to be exempted, the court held that the exemption
should include all land that was "'needful and convenient"' for the
performance of the college's purpose as set forth in its charter. 58 A
second important aspect of the holding was that although some buildInstitute of Holy Angels v. Bender, 79 N.J.L. 34, 36, 74 A. 251, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1909), was
followed by the court in Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 466, 217 A. 2d 868,
873 (1966). Interestingly enough, the Holy Angels interpretation of the 1903 statute which read
"five acres in extent for each" is precedent although the statute was amended in 1918 to eliminate the words "for each." Compare An Act for the assessment and collection of taxes, ch. 208,
§ 1, [1903] N.J. LAws 394 with An Act for the assessment and collection of taxes, ch. 236, § 203
[1918] N.J. LAws 847.
5' 24 N.J.L. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1854).
" 35 N.J. Super. 67, 113 A.2d 182 (App. Div. 1955). This case viewed "'necessary for the
fair enjoyment"' as an exception to the requirement that the land be "the land whereon . . . the
buildings . . . are erected." Id. at 70, 113 A.2d at 183 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6
(West 1949)).
54 73 N.J.L. 699, 65 A. 500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907). For cases following the Cory holding,
see Township of Denville v. St. Francis Sanitarium, 89 N.J.L. 293, 295-97, 98 A. 254, 254-55 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1916); Hoboken v. Division of Tax Appeals, 134 N.J.L. 594, 595, 49 A.2d 587, 588
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 136 N.J.L. 328, 55 A.2d 290 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946);
Institute of Holy Angels v. Bender, 79 N.J.L. 34, 36, 74 A. 251, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Stevens
Inst. v. Bowes, 74 N.J.L. 80, 81, 70 A. 730, 731 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Congregation St. Vincent de

Paul v. Brackley, 67 N.J.L. 176, 177-78, 50 A. 589, 589-90 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Rector, Christ
Church v. Millburn Tp., 26 N.J. Misc. 123, 128, 57 A.2d 506, 509 (Div. Tax App. 1948);
Hoboken v. Stevens Inst., 25 N.J. Misc. 461, 55 A.2d 231 (Div. Tax App. 1947); Mt. Olivet
Church v. Newark, 19 N.J. Misc. 232, 232, 18 A.2d 581, 582 (Bd. Tax App. 1941). Although not
cited in the Cory opinion, the statutory interpretation identified with Cory appeared first in a
1902 pre-Cory decision of Children's Seashore House v. Atlantic City, 68 N.J.L. 385, 388-89,
53 A. 399, 401 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902).
55 24 N.J.L. at 500-01.
56 Id. at 48; see A Supplement to an act entitled "An Act concerning taxes" approved April
fourteenth, eighteen hundred and forty-six, ch. 5, § 2, [1851] N.J. LAws 271. This statute did
not contain the phrase "necessary for the fair enjoyment."
57 24 N.J.L. at 500-01.
58 Id.
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ings were separated by public streets, the tax exemption was not affected. 5 9
Subsequent to the Ross decision, the case of Sisters of Charity v.
Cory, 60 was regarded as the controlling decision concerning the eligibility of a charitable organization for property tax exemptions. 6 1 The
court in Cory introduced a two-prong test for determining whether
an exemption should be granted. 62 The first prong of the test required that the land be the actual land upon which the building was
situated. 63 The court identified the second prong as the determination of how much land was necessary for the fair enjoyment of the
building up to the permitted five acres per building limit . 4 The
significance of this two-pronged test was that any land acquired subsequent to the erection of the building would fail the test, leaving the
65
property open to taxation.
The Cory case overruled a prior decision of the New Jersey court
of errors and appeals,"6 which had exempted, without regard to the
date of acquisition, all land that was being used for the Sisters of
Charity's tax exempt purpose. 67 The Cory court determined that the
statutory language offered a clear and unambiguous expression of the
legislative intent behind the statute, and accordingly felt compelled to
68
follow this mandate.

5 Id. at 501.
r: 73 N.J.L. 699, 65 A. 500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907).
61 See 72 N.J. at 397-98, 371 A.2d at 26-27.
62 73 N.J.L. at 703, 65 A. at 501-02. In setting out the test, the court's language left no
doubt as to the application of the test. The court stated that
[tihe statute creates a double test, to be applied for the purpose of determining
whether or not a given parcel of land is entitled to exemption from taxation-first,
is it the very tract upon which the building was erected, or does it include land
acquired at a period subsequent to the erection of the building? Second, if it is the
tract upon which the building was erected, then is all of it necessary for the fair
enjoyment of the building?
Id. (emphasis in original).
63 Id.
94Id.

65 Id.
66 Sisters of Charity v. Chatham, 52 N.J.L. 373, 20 A. 292 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890) (overruled by Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699, 707, 65 A. 500, 503 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907)).
67 Sisters of Charity v. Chatham, 52 N.J.L. 373, 376, 20 A. 292, 293 (Ct. Err. & App.
1890). Using an analysis similar to Ross, the court did not consider the date of acquisition of the
property. Id. at 375-76, 20 A. at 293. Interestingly enough, the Cory court while overruling the
result in Sisters of Charity v. Borough of Chatham, 73 N.J.L. at 700-07, 65 A. at 500-03, did
not overrule the Ross decision. See Chatham v. Sisters of Charity, 92 N.J.L. 409, 410-11, 105
A. 204, 204-05 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918) ("the rule of law therein laid down stands unimpeached"
[referring to State v. Ross, 24 N.J.L. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1854)]).
68 73 N.J.L. at 702-03, 65 A. at 501.
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In contrast to the restrictive approach enunciated in Cory is the
more expansive rationale taken in Congregation B'nai Yisroel v.
Township of Millburn. 6 9 In Yisroel, the congregation purchased,
with one deed, two parcels of land 70 which were divided in half by a
public road and totaled less than five acres. 7 1 A temple was constructed on one side of the road, and the remaining half of the land
was used as a parking lot for the temple. 72 Millburn Township
exempted the tract on which the temple was built, and assessed taxes
on the tract used as a parking lot. 73 In assessing taxes on the parking
lot, Millburn conceded that the parking lot was " 'necessary for the
fair enjoyment' of the" temple. 74 Nevertheless, Millburn contended
that the lot was not "the land whereon the building was erected," and
75
therefore, could not pass the first prong of the Cory test.
The appellate division struck down Millburn Township's tax assessment, stating that Cory's literal interpretation of the statutory
76
language had produced a result contrary to the legislature's intent.
In reaching this result, the court ruled by implication that "the
necessary for the fair enjoyment" determination was not a second test
to be applied, but rather an exception to the first prong of the Cory
test. 77 The court justified its position by positing that all the land
78
would be exempt if the road had not existed.
In speaking for the Boys' Club court, 79 Justice Schreiber discussed three issues which he identified as standards specified by the
exemption statute that had to be satisfied in order for a tax exemption
to be valid. 8 0 These requirements were the taxpayer's "exclusive
use" of the buildings and land for the tax exempt purpose, 8 1 the organization's profitability motive, 8 2 and determination that the land
83
was "necessary for the fair enjoyment" of the buildings.
69 35 N.J. Super. 67, 113 A.2d 182 (App. Div. 1955).
70 Id. at 69, 113 A.2d at 182-83. Although the deed described the land conveyed as three
contiguous tracts, Millburn conceded that for all intents and purposes the land "could very
simply have been described by a surveyor as one parcel and included in the deed as such." Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.

74 Id. (emphasis in original).
75 Id. at 70, 113 A.2d at 183.
76

Id.

77 See id.
78 Id. at 72-73, 113 A.2d at 184-85.
19 The majority opinion delivered by Justice Schreiber was joined by Chief Justice Hughes
and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Clifford. 72 N.J. at 412, 371 A.2d at 31.
80 Id. at 399-406, 371 A.2d at 27-31.
81 Id.
82
83

at 399, 371 A.2d at 27.

Id. at 403-04, 371 A.2d at 30.
Id, 401-03, 371 A.2d at 28-29.
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One statutory element recognized by Justice Schreiber was the
requirement that the taxpayer's buildings and land under scrutiny "be
exclusively used" for the organization's dedicated purpose.8 4 To substantiate this interpretation, Justice Schreiber referred to the language and legislative history of section 54:4-3.6, and found that the
statute focused upon "the physical use of the property." 8 5 Unlike
t'he State Division of Tax Appeals, the majority of the Boys' Club
court identified the receipt of rental income by a qualified organization as being merely one factor in determining whether the actual use
of the property was consistent with the taxpayer's qualified purpose.8 6 On this l~sis, Justice Schreiber held that the off-season use
of the camp by another qualified charitable or benevolent organization would not -affect Boys' Club's tax exempt status. 8 7

The majority

determined that the use of the camp by church groups was consistent
with Boys' Club's qualified purpose and did not negate the availability
of a tax exemption to Boys' Club.8 8 Recognizing an educational institution as not having a purpose considered qualified under the tax
exemption statute, 8 9 Justice Schreiber nevertheless held that the use
of the camp by the college groups would not affect the tax status
Id. at 399-400, 371 A.2d at 27 (emphasis omitted).
85 Id. at 399, 371 A.2d at 27. By "physical use" the majority was referring to the purpose of
the activity being conducted in the building. See id.
86 Id. Justice Schreiber viewed rental income as a vital factor in determining both the organization which is actually using the property, and whether the purpose is one within the
statute's purview. Id.
87 id. at 400, 371 A.2d at 28; see An Act concerning exemption from taxation, and amending, section 54:3.6 of the Revised Statutes ch. 85, § 1, [1949] N.J. LAws 394. The 1949
amendment made a distinction between charitable, benevolent or religious organizations and
educational organizations. Id. This was accomplished by the deletion of the education classification, while the Bill was in the New Jersey State Senate. See 1949 N.J. SENATE JOURNAL 425,
501 (amending "Assembly Bill No. 281, entitled 'An Act concerning exemptions from taxation,
and amending section 54:4-3.6 of the Revised Statutes"').
88 72 N.J. at 399-400, 371 A.2d at 27-28. In the majority opinion, Justice Schreiber cited
the decision of Trustees of Y.M. & Y.W.H.A. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 119 N.J.L. 504, 197
A. 372 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 121 N.J.L. 65, 1 A.2d 367 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938) (en banc), which
denied an exemption based on a non-profit organization's rental income from other qualified
organizations. This result was reversed by an amendment to the statute passed in 1949, An Act
concerning exemptions from taxation, and amending, section 54:3.6 of the Revised Statutes ch.
85, § 1, [1949] N.J. LAWS 394.
The 1949 amendment broadened the rental provision by stating that
all buildings owned by a corporation created under or otherwise subject to the
provisions of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes and actually and exclusively used in
the work of one or more associations or corporations organized exclusively for
charitable or religious purposes, which associations or corporations may or may not
pay rent for the use of the premises or the portions of the premises used by
them....
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because that particular "usage was emergent, non-recurring, and de

mniniws." 90
Examining the question regarding the use of the exempted property by a profit-making corporation, the court recognized that such
use might threaten the tax exemption granted to the qualified organization. 91 However, as to the use of the cabins by Snow Bowl, Inc. in
the winter of 1972, the court found that this usage had no bearing on
the tax liability of Boys' Club in 1971 and 1972.92 In Justice
Schreiber's opinion, there was no evidence indicating that the camp's
buildings and the land comprising Lot IA had not been used exclu93
sively for Boys' Club's tax exempt purpose.
A second element for determining tax exempt status discussed by
the court was the question of profitability. 94 Noting that Boys' Club's
expenses outweighed its revenues for the tax years in dispute, 95 Justice Schreiber indicated that even if the camp had operated at a
profit, the exemption would not necessarily be lost if the profits were
used in furtherance of the organization's qualified purpose. 96 According to Justice Schreiber, the proper inquiry was not whether the operation had made a profit or loss, but rather whether the operation
had been conducted for the purpose of making a profit. 9 7 Consequently, the court focused on the aims or goals of the organization
rather than the balance sheet. 9 8
A third element examined by Justice Schreiber was the extent to
which the land was "necessary for the fair enjoyment" of Boys' Club's
89 72 N.J. at 400, 371 A.2d at 28.
90 Id. (emphasis in original). Justice Schreiber noted that Jefferson Township had not asserted that this issue was violative of the statute. Id. Additionally, Justice Schreiber stated that

the single overnight use of the camp by skiers from Snow Bowl, Inc. could also be categorized
as a de minimus use. Id.
91

id.

92 Id. at 400 & n.4, 371 A.2d at 28. Section 54:4-63.26 treats a tax exemption lost by reason
of a change in land use as omitted property. Therefore, the applicable rule under such circumstances required that the formerly exempt property be assessed for the property taxes for
the tax year beginning on the following January 1. 72 N.J. at 400 & n.4, 371 A.2d at 28. Since

the rental use of the property by Snow Bowl, Inc. occurred between October 1, 1972 and
January 1, 1973, if there was a loss of exemption the assessable date would be January 1, 1973.
Id. As the instant case was concerned only with the tax years of 1971 and 1972, the question
was moot.

93 72 N.J. at 399-401, 371 A.2d at 27-28. Using Justice Schreiber's definition of "exclusive
use," off season uses were all in the furtherance of Boys' Club's exempt purposes. Id.
94 Id. at 403-04, 371 A.2d at 30.

95 Id. at 403, 371 A.2d at 30; see note 8 supra.
96 72 N.J. at 403-04, 371 A.2d at 30. For a detailed analysis of the criteria for nonprofitability, see notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
9' See 72 N.J. at 403-04, 371 A.2d at 30.
98 See id.
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buildings. 99 In making this determination, the majority rejected the
Cory test '00 and adopted an approach similar to that utilized by the
Yisroel court.'10 In Justice Schreiber's view, the statute did not limit
the exemption merely to the land on which the building was
situated. 10 2 In this regard, the court determined that "necessary for
the fair enjoyment" implied that other land was potentially exempt to
the extent of five acres per building. 0 3
In interpreting the concept of "necessary for the fair enjoyment,"
Justice Schreiber stated that it referred to the use of the land in relation to the use of the building. 10 4 He reasoned that in reference to
the statute, the definition of the word "necessary" was not "absolutely
indispensable," but rather any land that was "reasonably necessary to
accomplish the institution's purposes."105 To illustrate this interpretation, Justice Schreiber offered a hypothetical situation similar to the
facts set forth in Yisroel. 10 6 Applying the Cory approach to the facts
of the hypothetical, the tax status of the land would be determined by
10 7
the time of acquisition, rather than need.
In addressing the facts in Boys' Club, the majority felt that to
determine the extent of land eligible for an exemption the camp's
buildings should be viewed as a single entity, rather than individual

99 Id. at 401-03, 371 A.2d at 28-29. Justice Schreiber's test involves the interpretation of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), the relevant language being
that
the land whereon any of the buildings herein-before mentioned are erected, and
which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, and which is devoted to the
purposes above mentioned and to no other purposes and does not exceed 5 acres in
extent ...
Id.
100 See 72 N.J. at 397-403, 371 A.2d at 27-29. For further discussion of the Cory two-prong
test, see notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
101See id. at 401-02, 371 A.2d at 28-29. For further discussion of the Yisroel approach, see
notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
102 Id. at 401, 371 A.2d at 28.
103 Id.
The majority cited the opinion in Congregation B'nai Yisroel v. Township of Millburn,

35 N.J. Super. 67, 70, 113 A.2d 182, 183 (App. Div. 1955), as support for this position. See id.
104 72 N.J. at 401, 371 A.2d at 28.
105Id.
106Id. at 398, 371 A.2d at 27. In Justice Schreiber's hypothetical situation the facts were that
if a church was erected on a five acre piece of land, part of which was paved as a parking lot,
the entire piece of land would be exempt. However, if the church and parking lot were located
on adjoining pieces of land, one having been subsequently purchased, the parking lot would be
taxable. Tax liability would result under the prevailing interpretation of section 54:4-3.6 since
the after acquired property was not the land on which the buildings were located. 72 N.J. at
398, 401-02, 371 A.2d at 27, 28-29. Compare 72 N.J. at 398, 371 A.2d at 27 with 35 N.J.
Super. 67, 69, 113 A.2d 182, 182-83 (App. Div. 1955).
107 See 72 N.J. at 398, 371 A.2d at 27.
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structures. 10 8 Justice Schreiber supported this position by reasoning
that all the buildings were "integrated components necessary for the
proper operation of the camp." 109 He cited additional support from
the stipulated facts presented to the appellate division, 1 10 which
clearly showed that Lot 1A was being utilized for the same camp
function as the buildings in question.'1 1
Lastly, on a collateral question the court ruled that the Boys'
Club decision would apply only to those tax years for which Boys'
Club had filed an appeal."i 2 The court conferred jurisdiction on the
New Jersey Division of Tax Appeals to consider the question of
l 3
exemption for the tax years in which no appeal had been filed."
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Conford 1 14 criticized the majority decision, stating that it went beyond the proper function of the
court. 11 5 Judge Conford believed that it was the province of the6
legislature, not the judiciary, to make major changes in tax policy."
At the outset, Judge Conford noted that section 54:4-3.6 focused
primarily on the building and only secondarily on the land. 1 17 In

108 See id. at 401-03, 371 A.2d at 28-29. In adopting this position, Justice Schreiber rejected
the tax assessor's finding which would have exempted one quarter of an acre per building. Id. at
403, 371 A.2d at 29.
109 Id. at 401-02, 371 A.2d at 29.
110 Id. at 402-03, 371 A.2d at 29.
M"Id. at 403, 371 A.2d at 29.
112 Id. at 405, 371 A.2d at 30-31. The court reversed two cases to the extent that they were
contrary to the Boys' Club holding. Id. The cases were Catholic Charities v. City of
Pleasantville, 109 N.J. Super. 475, 263 A.2d 803 (App. Div. 1970), and City of Newark v. Essex
County Bd. of Taxation, 110 N.J. Super. 93, 264 A.2d 461 (Law Div. 1970).
Boys' Club contended that no appeal was necessary by virtue of the holding in Catholic
Charities v. City of Pleasantville, 109 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1970). The majority rejected
this position by indicating that N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:2-43, :3-26 (West 1960), the so-called
"freeze" statutes, did not apply to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6. 72 N.J. at 405, 371 A.2d at
30-31.
The "freeze" statutes allow judgments as to valuation for one year to be considered "conclusive and binding" for the following two years. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:2-43, :3-26 (West 1960).
The court found no reason to apply this same rationale to tax exemption statutes. 72 N.J. at 405,
371 A.2d at 30-31.
113 Id. The court stated that it would not retain jurisdiction over the question of appeals for
1973 and 1974. Id. at 405-06, 371 A.2d at 30-31.
114 Id. at 406, 371 A.2d at 31. Judge Conford was temporarily assigned to sit on the supreme
court.
'15Id.
116 Id. An additional question raised by Judge Conford was the effect that the majority decision would have on municipalities, which would lose tax revenue by virtue of this decision. Id.
117 Id. judge Conford's view that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 was directed at buildings rather
than land was also accepted by the majority. See 72 N.J. at 395-96, 371 A.2d at 26. The
majority of cases have so held. See also notes 29-44 supra and accompanying text.
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Judge Conford's opinion this interpretation was supported by "[t]he
very tenor of the statute.""11
Examining the statutory framework of review, the dissent identified four requirements in order for land to- qualify as tax exempt.
Under these standards, the land must: (1) be "that 'whereon ... the
buildings are erected"'; (2) "'be necessary for the fair enjoyment' of
the building; (3) be "'devoted to' the exempted purpose" as the building; and (4) "'not exceed 5 acres in extent."' 119 In Judge Conford's
20
opinion, Lot LA failed to satisfy all but the third requirement.1
In examining the five acre limitation, Judge Conford noted that
five acres was not the amount of land to be automatically exempt in
every case, but rather the statutory maximum that could be accorded
once an assessor had determined how much land was "necessary for
the fair enjoyment of th[e] building." 1 21 Accordingly, Judge Conford
indicated that it was possible for less than five acres to be the total of
exempt land for a group of buildings. 12 2 In his opinion, it was highly
unlikely that each of Boys' Club's buildings would need five acres of
23
land to carry out each building's particular function. 1
In reaching this conclusion, the dissent, as opposed to the majority, focused on the function of each individual building.' 24 Judge
Conford indicated that he felt constrained to oppose the majority's
position due to the statute's emphasis on buildings rather than
land. 1 2 5 Although recognizing the majority's theory of viewing the
camp as a whole, the dissent was still not willing to automatically
exempt Lot IA entirely as the lot's uses were not related to the utili1 26
zation of each of the buildings.

118 72 N.J. at 406, 371 A.2d at 31.

119 Id. at 406, 371 A.2d at 31 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp.

1978-1979)).
120 72 N.J. at 406, 371 A.2d at 31. Judge Conford conceded that Lot IA was being used for
the same purpose as Lot 15. Id.
121 Id. at 406-07, 371 A.2d at 31. The exemption granted by the majority was potentially
within the five acre limitation, since there were 28 buildings located on Lot 15 and a total of
100 acres of land. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 15.
122 72 N.J. at 406-07, 371 A.2d at 31-32; see Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J.
457, 466, 217 A.2d 868, 873 (1966); Institute of Holy Angels v. Bender, 79 N.J.L. 34, 36-37, 74
A. 251, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1909). See also note 52 supra and accompanying text.
123 72 N.J. at 407, 371 A.2d at 32. The tax assessor for Jefferson Township had indicated that
he would exempt one quarter of an acre per building. See id. at 403, 371 A.2d at 29.
124 Id. at 408, 371 A.2d at 32.
125 ld.

126 Id. at 407-09, 371 A.2d at 32-33. Judge Conford felt that Boys' Club failed to show that
all the land on Lot IA was needed to carry out the individual functions of the buildings on Lot
15. Id.
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From this analysis, the dissent concluded that Boys' Club had
not met its burden of proving that the land was necessary for the fair
enjoyment of the buildings.' 2 7 Judge Conford strengthened this
position by pointing out that Boys' Club's land was not land "whereon
the buildings [are] erected." 128 In Judge Conford's view, the language of the statute was "so plain and unambiguous that [the] courts
have always felt obliged to enforce it with strictness." 129 Judge
Conford proposed that the Cory test should be followed,13 0 and thus
all land acquired subsequent to the erection of the buildings would
be automatically subject to taxation. 1:31 This proposition was buttressed by the fact that after the Cory decision the legislature had
x
not altered the effect of the language of' section 54:4-3.6. 12
Judge Conford did express a willingness to moderate his position
in regard to strict construction, however, by indicating that he would
favor a modification of the Cory test, but only if the -after acquired
land's use and purpose were so similar to that of the building that the
land could be considered curtilage.a13 Lastly, Judge Conford agreed
with the majority that this decision should -affect only the tax years for
4
which Boys' Club had filed appeals.'1
The significance of the decision in Boys' Club lies in the context
of what can now be viewed as good law. l1 5 Clearly, the Boys' Club
decision is a fiontal attack on the Cory two-prong test, l1 6 and all the
cases applying the Cory rationale.13 7 By expanding the already
broad view of the Yisroel court, case law has now come full circle

127

See id. at 408-09, 371 A.2d at 32-33.
at 409-10, 371 A.2d at 33-34.

128 Id.

129 id.
To support his theory, Judge Conford cited Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699,
64 A. 500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907) and Childrens Seashore House v. Atlantic City, 68 N.J.L.
385, 53 A. 399 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902).
130 See 72 N.J. at 409, 371 A.2d at 33. For an in depth discussion of the Cory test, see notes

62-69 supra and accompanying text.
21
72 N.J. at 409-10, 371 A.2d at 33.
132 Id.
at 410, 371 A.2d at 33-34.
at 410-11, 371 A.2d at 33-34.
at 411, 371 A.2d at 34. Judge Conford, however, felt that it was not proper for the
court to confer jurisdiction on the Division of Tax Appeals. Id. Judge Conford reasoned that the
court could not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Division of Tax Appeals, as such jurisdiction was lacking by statute. Id. In his view, subject matter jurisdiction was a matter pursuant
133 Id.
134

Id.

to statute rather than judicial discretion. Id.
135 The majority, by rejecting the Cory test, has by implication overruled all the cases which

followed that test. For a list of the cases which have followed the Cory approach, see note 56
supra.
136 See 72 N.J. at 404-05, 371 A.2d at 30.
137 See note 56 supra.
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back to the earliest view taken by the Ross court.' 13 Further, the
Boys' Club test has altered the effect of the statute by eliminating the
"land whereon the building is erected" requirement of the Cory
test.' 39 By ignoring the statute's very language, the court has seemingly disregarded the strict construction rule which had previously
140
been applied to tax statutes.
The dissent, however, convincingly asserts that the statute's language is clear in its intended meaning as judicially interpreted,
thereby obviating the need for a determination of the legislative intent behind the statute. 1 4 1 This position, however, loses some persuasiveness due to the inconsistent interpretations of the statutory
42
.language by New Jersey's courts. 1
Although the Boys' Club decision represents a large step in
eliminating the confusion surrounding the area of charity property tax
exemptions, there is a need for the legislature to re-examine the statute and remove any language that is contrary to the result which the
legislature intended. Such an amendment would involve, no doubt,
political consideration of the impact upon municipal taxation systems
due to increased aggregate tax exempt property.
The Boys' Club majority reached the proper result. Section
54:4-3 was enacted as an aid for charitable and benevolent nonprofit
organizations. The strict Cory approach severely limited the relief
available to such organizations. In light of the accentuated problems
caused by an inflationary economy, the court has sensibly expanded
the tax exemption to all land utilized by the organization for its qualified purpose irrespective of the date of acquisition. However, by disregarding its own rule of strict statutory construction, the court may
have eroded the precedential value of their decision.
Kevin M. Hart
138 Compare State v. Ross, 24 N.J.L. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1854) with Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73

N.J.L. 699, 65 A. 500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907). Interestingly enough, the holding in Boys' Club
resembled the prior court of errors and appeals decision that was overruled by the Cory court.
See State v. Collector of Chatham, 52 N.J.L. 373, 375, 20 A. 292, 294 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890)

("[n]o reason is perceived why the statutory immunity should not appertain to the lands comprehended in this controversy").
139 See 72 N.J. at 404, 371 A.2d at 30. Under the Cory test, any after acquired property
would fail the first prong of the test, while under the Boys' Club holding the property would be
potentially exempt. Compare 73 N.J.L. at 703, 65 A. at 501-02 with 72 N.J. at 404, 371 A.2d at
30.
140 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
14'See 72 N.J. at 409-10, 371 A.2d at 33-34.
142 Compare Congregation B'nai Yisroel v. Township of Millburn, 35 N.J. Super. 67, 113
A.2d 182 (App. Div. 1955) and State v. Ross, 24 N.J.L. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1854) with Sisters of
Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699, 65 A. 500 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907).

